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A RESPONSE ON CARDOZO TO PROFESSORS
KAUFMAN AND SCHWARTZ
Richard H. Weisberg
COMMENTARY
In last year's Clifford Symposium Issue of this Review, a rich dis-
cussion of Benjamin Cardozo's opinions and jurisprudence emerged.
Previously engaged most creatively, perhaps, in the first number of a
law review named after the great judge,' this more recent discussion
of Cardozo's craft was animated by the appearance of Professor An-
drew Kaufman's book, Cardozo,2 and included brief essays by Profes-
sor Kaufman himself, Judge Robert E. Keeton, and Professor Gary
Schwartz. In his article, Professor Schwartz builds on Professor Kauf-
man's assessment of my earlier work on Cardozo.3 I thank the editors
of this review for offering me space beyond my contribution else-
where in this volume to respond on the perennially fascinating ques-
tion of Cardozo's way of doing justice.
All my writing on Cardozo has been in the service of what I deem
to be his own central jurisprudential vision, and this can be briefly re-
articulated through a bifurcated aphorism: the judge must grapple
constantly with an awareness of the inevitable subjectivity of adjudica-
tion;4 but, although no pre-existing rule inevitably dictates the out-
come of any case, "a working knowledge of the business" 5 usually
points all judges to the same resolution of most cases. Vital for Car-
dozo, I believe, is that "the business" of judging involves considerable
creativity. In fact, this concept can be brought to bear any time the
judge feels that an outcome would be unjust if it simply followed from
1. See Paul A. Freund, Foreword: Homage to Mr. Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 1-3
(1979), and full symposium that follows.
2. ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998).
3. See, e.g., Richard H. Weisberg, Law, Literature and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO
L. REv. 283, 283 [hereinafter Judicial Poetics]; RICHARD H. WEISBERG, WHEN LAWYERS WRITE
7-12 (1987); Richard H. Weisberg, Judicial Discretion, or the Self on the Shelf, 10 CARDOZO L.
REv. 105, 108-110 (1988) [hereinafter Self on Shelf].
4. See Self on Shelf, supra note 3, at 108 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1924)); see also Judicial Poetics, supra note 3, at 296 (citing BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 127 (1928)).
5. BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 98 (1924).
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a formal rule; the craft of language will "liberate at times ' 6 from the
bonds of formalism the just outcome pursued always by the
adjudicator.
Professor Schwartz misunderstands me to be saying that Cardozo
would usually "lean on or manipulate precedent somewhat in order to
achieve the results he desired."' 7 However, this comment misses my
aphoristic point in two ways. First, justice for Cardozo often follows
from the precedents, which thus resolve the great majority of cases.
Second, however, any case can and should be rendered "hard" when
the judge believes that the pre-existing rule alone would yield an un-
just outcome. Nowhere do I make Judge Cardozo into a manipulative
judge; he was, indeed, quite respectful of the norm of professionalism
that is linked to precedent. Superceding that norm, however, is a feel-
ing for justice, not purely subjective in nature, but rather emerging
from what Cardozo consistently calls the "trained intuition" of the
judge. 8
There is never a pre-ordained outcome, for Cardozo, waiting either
to be followed or "manipulated." The adjudicator always has choices,
and these must follow a trained but imperfect inner sense of justice.
Even the most formalistic judge always instantiates that sense of jus-
tice, and it is fallacious in any case (for Cardozo) to assume that a
"precedent-based" outcome is more objective than a "reach" towards
a more just result. No judge, however traditional or "conservative"
(or call it what you will), can escape his or her own trained intuitions.
Thus, in one of only two cases exemplifying for Professor Schwartz
Cardozo's reach beyond the precedents, in Hynes v. New York Central
Railroad Cardozo insists (to the contrary) that "the courts below"
have rigidly sought to pursue their own intuition, one which subjec-
tively and wrongly led them to formalism instead of justice.9 Cardozo
insists, within this case, that his approach represents a "readjustment"
of conflicting laws,' 0 a correction of the lower courts' limited intuition.
Thus, I believe Professors Schwartz and Kaufman have missed Car-
dozo in two key respects, and Professor Kaufman on his own in one
other, and these errors are far more important than any they have
made about my work. First, Cardozo's method as I describe it can be
6. See Judicial Poetics, supra note 3, at 314-15 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 89).
7. Gary T. Schwartz, Cardozo as Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 305, 307 (1999).
8. See CARDOZO, supra note 5, at 93 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision,
36 HARv. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923)).
9. See Self on Shelf, supra note 3, at 108-110 (arguing that writing skills were important to
Cardozo's success as exemplified in Hynes v. New York Central Railroad, 131 N.E. 898, 900
(N.Y. 1921)).
10. Hynes v. New York Central Railroad, 131 N.E. 898, 900 (N.Y. 1921).
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seen in many cases, not just in one or two. I cite at least a dozen cases
in my earlier work,' cases in which Cardozo often makes explicit that
the "rule" itself is to be followed usually, but that obedience to prece-
dent itself is merely one judicial "intuition" among many that can be
utilized by the adjudicator.' 2 Second, as I have argued here, they have
failed to see Cardozo's consistent point about outcomes: that they are
neither pre-determined nor frequently open to a legitimate challenge
of "manipulat[ing] precedent.' 13
Third, and I see this as a flaw in Professor Kaufman's biography,
not at all in Professor Schwartz's brief assessment, Cardozo must be
recalled primarily as a judge who wanted to empower his colleagues
by reminding them that, willy-nilly, appellate adjudicators are word-
smiths. The aspiration to justice dovetails perfectly with the require-
ment that judges rationalize their outcomes through language. Too
many judges today denigrate, delegate, or dissipate their linguistic
function. In paying scant attention to what was central in Cardozo's
adjudication, Professor Kaufman's otherwise admirable book misses
both the mark and the mission of his subject.
11. See Judicial Poetics, supra note 3, at 320-342.
12. See, e.g., Judicial Poetics, supra note 3, at 337-41 (illustrating Cardozo's overt justification
for ignoring New York's time honored aversion to the doctrine of incorporation by reference in
In re Fowles, 118 N.E. 611 (N.Y. 1918). My prior analysis of Cardozo's jurisprudence, which is
not of course limited to torts cases, has foregrounded Palsgraf and MacPherson, as well as Hynes
and cases like Fowles and many others from his years on the New York Court of Appeals. See
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050 (N.Y. 1916); Hynes v. New York Central R.R., 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921); In re Fowles, 118
N.E. 611 (N.Y. 1918).
13. See Schwartz, supra note 7 at 307.
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